Blog 6: Social Systems- Game Harvest: Tragedy of the Commons

The "Fishing Game" which was introduced to us in our social systems class attempts to challenge our understanding of the logic and consequences of social situations, and introduce us to the concept of "the Tragedy of the Commons". The core issue revolves around property rights, including both the formal and informal rules regarding the use, ownership, and transfer of property. Property ownership generally provides incentives for people to take into consideration the consequences of their actions regarding the property itself.  This is considered necessary due to the scarcity of certain resources. We were asked to understand the incentives that influence our decisions and explore what incentives would ensure sensible use of the resources, which in this case were fish. 

The students chose to continue harvesting the fish because they were afraid someone else would take the fish if they let them remain.  In this scenario the fish were the common good which is non-excludable, which means that there is a finite amount of the resource available and that it is therefore easily overexploited. Even though it was in their interest to sustain the fish populations they still over-fished which resulted in the depletion of the fish stock. I believe the saying "Don't Hate the Player, Hate the Game" fits well in this situation. The problem was not the students but the rules of the game. The rules of the game are:

·         Each round is one year. Each team decides how many fish they want to catch. Write down this number and put it in your boat

·         Facilitator takes boats and gives fish randomly to teams until they are gone. Rest of teams receive nothing

·         You get back your boat and harvest. Write down your profit

·         The sea starts with the maximum number of fish: 50. Each year, the remaining fish are able to produce one new fish, with a maximum of 50.

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Additional Rules of the Game

*Well defined, divisible and defendable property rights. This would established by allocating fishing permits. Each group would be given fishing permits at the start of the game giving them the right to harvest a particular amount of fish. This could be traded to other groups for existing fish in the risk of getting more or less fish in the future. 

*Negotiation time a start and middle of the game. Communication is vital in such undertakings, therefore if time would be allocated at the beginning and middle of the game for groups to discuss their plans outcomes would become more favorable to all players.

Tragedy of the Commons and Externalities

If property ownership is not clearly defined, divisible and defendable misuse of the property is likely to occur. The tragedy of the commons is a social dilemma where private ownership creates incentives that reward the efficient use of property and the conservation of resources for use in the future, public ownership tends to create incentives for overuse. This social dilemma is in fact a prisoner’s dilemma. Thus, negative externalities can be reversed by giving ownership of the problem. Hardin claimed that coercion could be a good way of creating self-restraint as long as it is mutually agreed upon by those affected. By owning the problem rational players will look for the best solution for both parties to benefit, in this case through fishing permits. Thus complete self-organization is not possible.

References
1) Hardin, G. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons, Science pp. 1243-1248. 

2) Ostrom, E. (2008). Tragedy of the Commons. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 3573-3576.

3) Hardin, G. (1998). Extensions of" The Tragedy of the Commons". Science, 280(5364), 682-683.